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THE AT&T AGREEMENT:
REORGANIZATION OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY & CONFLICTS WITH
ILLINOIS LAW
FREDRIC D. TANNENBAUM* & MICHAEL P. HURST**
INTRODUCTION***

On January 8, 1982, the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company (AT&T) and the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) signed a stipulation,1 seeking to dismiss the largest antitrust case in history.2 Under the proposed stipulation, the DOJ's
suit against AT&T would be dismissed without prejudice and the
provisions of the 1956 consent decree would be substantially
* Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, Public Utility Division; J.D.
University of Wisconsin, 1981; B.A., magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa, economics, Ohio Wesleyan University, 1978.
** Technical Supervisior of Public Utilities Division of the Attorney
General of Illinois, M.A., with honors, Roosevelt University 1979.
*** This article represents the individual opinions of the authors and
does not necessarily represent the position of the Attorney General of
Illinois.
1. FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a) (1) (ii).

2. United States v. AT&T, Western Electric Co., Inc., and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., Civ. No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. filed November 20, 1974).
The DOJ fied suit against AT&T and its Western Electric and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. subsidiaries on November 20, 1974. The complaint
charged defendants with unlawfully monopolizing the domestic telecommunications industry in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976)) in three ways. First, the DOJ alleged that AT&T entrenched itself as
the dominant supplier of telecommunications, telephones and other terminal equipment through its Western Electric subsidiary with leasing fee and
tie-in arrangements. Second, the government contended that AT&T foreclosed competition in interexchange services by charging discriminatory
access charges to competitors. Finally, the complaint charged that AT&T
created unnatural incentives to encourage the 22 Bell Operating Companies
(BOCs) to purchase from Western Electric.
The trial began before U.S. District Court Judge Harold Greene in
Washington D.C. on January 15, 1981. The court denied defendants' motion
to dismiss on September 11, 1981, finding that the government in its case-inchief had shown that "the Bell System has violated the antitrust laws in a
number of ways over a lengthy period of time .... [T]he burden is on defendants to refute the factual showing made in the government's case-inchief." United States v. AT&T, 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1381 (D.D.C. 1981).
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modified.3 As modified, the agreement substantially restructures the telecommunications industry. Broadly speaking,
AT&T is compelled to forfeit its role as the country's principal
purveyor of local telephone service. In return, the agreement allows AT&T to retain its stronghold over every other marketable
aspect of the industry and to expand into the information
market.
Removal of AT&T from the local service market is accomplished via a spin-off4 of the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs)
to AT&T shareholders.5 Presently, the BOCs, which are wholly3. In 1949, the Justice Department filed suit against AT&T and its
equipment manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric, alleging that the
two companies had conspired to restrain and monopolize trade in violation
of the Sherman Act. United States v. Western Electric Co., Civ. No. 17-49
(D.N.J. filed Jan. 14, 1949). Among other requested relief, that suit sought
AT&T's divestiture of Western Electric. In 1956, the parties entered into a
consent decree which, although not requiring divestiture, prohibited AT&T
from engaging in a number of business activities. United States v. Western
Electric Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956) (consent decree).
In particular, section V of the decree, subject to certain exceptions, prohibited AT&T from engaging in any business other than providing "common
carrier communications services" or services "incidental" thereto. Id. Further, Section IV of the decree, with certain exceptions, prohibited AT&T and
Western Electric from manufacturing for sale or lease any equipment not of
a type sold by AT&T and its operating companies for use in furnishing
"common carrier communications services." Id.
4. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Nos. 74-1698, 82-0192, 820025(pl), Section I(A)(4). A "spin-off" occurs when, for example, A corporation forms B corporation and places part of its assets in B corporation in
return for all of the B corporation's stock. A corporation then distributes
the B corporation's stock pro rata to A's shareholders so that A's shareholders now own all of the stock of both A and B.
5. The 22 wholly-owned BOCs are:
Bell Telephone Company of Nevada
Illinois Bell Telephone Company
Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated
Michigan Bell Telephone Company
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company
New Jersey Bell Telephone Company
New York Telephone Company
Northwestern Bell Telephone Company
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company
South Central Bell Telephone Company
Southern Bell Telephone Company
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
The Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia
The Diamond State Telephone Company
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company
The Ohio Bell Telephone Company
The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
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owned by AT&T, provide diversified telephone service, including
local and long distance service, to the twenty-two regions in
which they are located. Once AT&T transfers ownership of the
BOC's under the terms of the stipulation, the BOCs would be
prohibited from providing "interexchange telecommunications
services," (basic intrastate or interstate long distance service),
manufacturing or providing "telecommunications products or
customer premises equipment," (e.g., telephones, switchboards,
switching systems), and from engaging in "any product or service ... that is not a natural monopoly service. .. 6 (e.g., Yellow
pages, Phone Center Stores, tone paging services, two-way radio
communication). In other words, the newly autonomous BOCs
would be restricted in their operations to providing local service
only and, although independently owned, would pose no competitive challenge to AT&T in the long-distance and customer
premises equipment markets.
In exchange for its forfeiture of the BOC's, AT&T is permitted to retain its Bell Telephone Laboratories, Western Electric
Company, and Long Lines Division. Bell Labs is the AT&T subsidiary which conducts the research and development of new
products and enhanced services (e.g., computerized telecommunications equipment). Western Electric manufactures and supplies the products developed by Bell Labs. Retention of the
extraordinarily sophisticated Bell Labs and Western Electric
subsidiaries assures AT&T continued leadership at the forefront
of technological innovation and manufacturing capability. Long
Lines provides long distance service and will enable AT&T to
continue to compete in the interexchange market.
Although AT&T is prospectively divested of its twenty-two
BOCs, which comprise two-thirds of its assets, it is amply compensated. AT&T currently uses the profits derived from long distance and enhanced services to subsidize and maintain its
BOCs. Once AT&T is divested of its BOCs, it is concomittantly
relieved of responsibility for their financial survival. Moreover,
AT&T would be operating outside of the highly regulated structure in which the BOCs and the independent telephone companies interact. In essence, the proposed agreement frees AT&T to
better exploit lucrative and expanding markets in products and
services while only giving up the closely regulated profits now
generated by the BOCs. Presumably whatever AT&T loses at
the local level will be converted into a gain in other markets.
The independent telephone companies (ITCs) 7 which were
not represented in the lawsuit or negotiations culminating in the
Wisconsin Telephone Company.
6. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Section H(D).
7. There are 49 independent telephone companies in Illinois.
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settlement, are affected as much if not more than the BOC's.
The BOCs interact with the ITCs under a highly regulated
scheme guaranteeing the independents access to the interexchange network at reasonable rates and with reasonable returns. The stiffer rates implicit in implementation of the
agreement potentially isolate some rural independent telephone
companies from the long distance network and impede the independents' ability to support their existing investment in local
exchange equipment. Specifically, isolation results from the dissolution of the division of revenues (DR) process for toll settlements and separations s and the requirement that the BOCs
cannot provide intrastate, interexchange connections.9
As will be explained, the BOCs, under the DR system, share
their AT&T subsidy with the independents. Divestiture of the
AT&T monopoly and dissolution of the DR process removes
what traditionally has been an important source of revenue to
the independents.
An additional, albeit equally serious, concern involves the
market entrenchment which the decree assures AT&T. The
BOCs, moreover, may confront a competitive disadvantage visa-vis AT&T and the surviving independent companies. This
spectre arises because the agreement permits AT&T to engage
in any profit-making enterprise it wishes, including competition
with the BOCs.10 The BOCs, on the other hand, are constrained
solely to providing "natural monopoly service."11 This constraint is severely and unnecessarily restrictive.
Finally, intertwined with the aforementioned problems, are
inherent conflicts between the agreement and well-settled Illinois law and public policy. The agreement, in many respects,
reverses consistent national and state policies, and ignores the
power of the Illinois Commerce Commission to effectuate these
policies. Preeminent among them is the objective, codified in
both the Communications Act of 193412 and the Illinois Public
Utilities Act, 13 that phone service be universally available. The
remainder of this article explores these problems in greater de8. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, $ B(1). See, 47
C.F.R. Part 67 (1980).
9. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Section Hl(D) (I).
10. AT&T can compete with the BOCs in specialized intraexchange
services utilizing coaxial cables, cellular radio, and microwave and satellite
transmissions. AT&T will also be supplied with BOCs' customer premises
equipment, phone center stores, yellow pages, tone paging services, and inside wiring.
11. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, section H(D) (3).
12. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1975).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 §§ 1 et. seq. (1981).
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tail, explains their ramifications on the Illinois ratepayers, and
recommends possible approaches or solutions.
THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE ADVERSELY AFFECTS AND
POTENTIALLY HARMS INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE
COMPANIES AND RURAL COMMUNrrIES IN

ILLINOIS
PresentIndustry Structure in Illinois
The Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC or Commission)
regulates fifty telephone utilities in the State of Illinois, fortynine of which are independent telephone companies. 14 The
ITCs provide local service throughout the state in areas not encompassed by the local BOC, Illinois Bell Telephone (IBT).
Their service territories are, therefore, relegated to the vast majority of small rural communities.
The ITCs' relationship with IBT is one of dependence. To
place a call from one ITC service territory or exchange to another, IBT currently provides most interexchange services. Intrastate interexchange rates (what one utility charges another
to interconnect with its exchange) are within the jurisdiction of
'16
the ICC. 15 The Commission sets these tariffs as "joint rates,
which are common to all telephone utilities in Illinois. 17 Under
the requirements of these joint rates, all telephone companies,
big and small alike, are required to interconnect to provide necessary service.' 8 To facilitate their interexchange connection,
ITCs contract with IBT. Under these contracts, each party collects its share of the revenue generated from interexchange
calls placed from its service territory. The revenues received
are then divided among the companies. The process of dividing
revenues between IBT and the ITCs is commonly referred to as
the division of revenues (DR, settlements, or cost) system. Two
approaches may be used.
The first approach employed to divide revenues among the
companies, utilized by most of the larger ITCs, is a "cost"
method. Part 67 of the FCC Regulations specifically delineates
14. These companies have no affiliation with Illinois Bell or AT&T. They

range in total capitalization from $240,381 (Chandlerville Telephone Company) to $58,143,482 (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Company). Operating
Statistics of Telephone Companies in Illinois, Accounts and Finance Department, Illinois Commerce Commission (May 1981).
15. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 40 (1981).
16. I.B.T. III.C.C. No. 5 Part 2 section 7, Part 4, Part 6, Part 9, Part 1 sections 4-6, 8-10, Part 3 sections 2, 13, 15, 16.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 42 (1981).
18. Id. at § 44.
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the methods and procedures for assigning "cost."'19 Assigning
cost between the two contracting companies equitably divides
revenue between them.
Those ITCs not employing the cost approach use the "average schedule" method. An average schedule contract provides
for a schedule of costs per call to determine the proper allocation of toll revenues between contracting companies. The average schedule method approximates cost based on industry
trends and experience. Schedules are periodically reviewed and
renegotiated by IBT and the ITCs. The average schedule
method is preferred, and most frequently used, by small rural
ITCs because it circumvents the itemization entailed in the cost
method and saves an administrative expense.
Under either approach, the local company (i.e. IBT or the
ITC) collects the revenue. This revenue is then divided among
the utilities by both the contracts and the DR process. The dependency of the ITCs on IBT for interexchange access is dramatized by considering that approximately sixty percent of a
typical ITC's total revenue is derived from the division of reve20
nue process.
In sum, the ITCs interact with IBT and the ICC, in three
important ways. First, the Commission certifies exchanges or
service territories for local service. Service territories do not
overlap. 21 Second, to provide interexchange service, telephone
companies enter into contracts. The contracts must first obtain
the "consent and approval of the Commission. '2 2 The contracts
utilize either the cost or average schedule method in the DR process to allocate the revenue collected and costs incurred between the parties. Finally, roughly sixty percent of all the ITC's
total revenue is derived from settlements under these contracts.
Some of this revenue is used to carry investment in so-called
local plant and equipment. This is commonly referred to as the
subsidy from toll to local services.
Illinois Law Promotes Limited Monopolies
The proposed consent decree between AT&T and the Department of Justice radically alters both the industry structure
19. 47 C.F.R. Part 67 (1980).
20. The average of Class "A" companies, excluding Illinois Bell Telephone Co. and General Telephone Co. of Illinois, is 57.5%. The average of
Class "B" companies is 63.9%. OperatingStatisticsof Telephone Companies
in Illinois, Accounts and Finance Department, Illinois Commerce Commission 34, 50 (May 1981).
21. See infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text. See also ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 56 (1981).
22. Id. at § 27.
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described above and conflicts with current Illinois law. The proposed agreement requires that the BOCs shall not "provide interexchange telecommunications services or information
services .... *23 This provision will require IBT to transfer its
investment in plant and equipment used to provide interexchange service. By disallowing IBT from providing intrastate
interexchange service, and by theoretically inviting any or all
toll carriers to compete in this lucrative market, the proposed
agreement undermines almost seventy years of consistent state
policy. "Limited monopolies" in interexchange service will be
replaced with potentially ruinous competition.
Illinois courts and regulators have long been guided by the
principle that:
The method of regulation of public utilities now in force in Illinois
is based on the theory of a regulated monopoly rather than competition .... The power of the state to regulate a utility carries with
it the power to protect such utility against indiscriminate
24 competition, and such power should be exercised to that end.
The Illinois Supreme Court has expounded several justifications
for adhering to the policy of protecting the limited monopoly of
the utility "first in the field." First, granting a limited monopoly
to the first in the field provides "the public with efficient service
at a reasonable rate, by compelling an established public utility
occupying a given field to provide adequate service and at the
same time protect it from ruinous competition. '25 Second, "protecting the pioneer in the field is based on a consideration of the
time and money expended by the pioneer in developing its business and rendering adequate service to the public ... and the
pioneer utility having taken the 'bitter with the sweet' throughout the years of development of the utility business in the
area." 26 Finally, the protection of the first in the field under the
limited monopoly theory is not "designed for the benefit of the
carrier alone, but for the benefit and convenience of the public
in general as well .... -27
23. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, section II(D) (I).
24. Egyptian Transportation System, Inc. v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 321
Ill. 580, 587-88, 152 N.E. 510, 512-13 (1926). See also Illinois Highway Transp.
Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 404 Ill.
610, 90 N.E.2d 86 (1950); Chicago & West

Towns Railways, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 383 Ill.
20, 48 N.E.2d 320
(1943).

25. Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle Motor Coach Line, 326 Ill.
200, 201, 157
N.E. 175, 176 (1927) cited in Chicago &West Towns Railways v. Illinois Com-

merce Comm'n, 383 Ill.
20, 27, 48 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1943).
26. Eagle Bus Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 3 Ill.2d 66, 70,
119 N.E.2d 915, 918 (1954).
27. Gulf Transport Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 40211. 11, 16-17,83
N.E.2d 336, 340-41 (1949).
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The statutory device which empowers the Illinois Commerce Commission to grant a limited monopoly to the first in the
field is a "certificate of public convenience and necessity."28 The
Commission certifies telephone utilities on an exchange by exchange basis. No exchanges overlap. Once the Commission has
awarded a certificate to a utility to serve a particular exchange,
the utility's preeminence will generally remain unchallenged.
Only in rare instances will the Commission either dislodge the
first in the field or certify a rival utility in the same exchange.
First, "[tlo authorize an order of the Commerce Commission
granting a certificate of convenience and necessity to one carrier
though another is in the field, it is necessary that it appear first
'
that the existing utility is not rendering adequate service. "29
Then, "the existing utility should be permitted to show that it
can furnish the needed service, and the Commission must find
that the existing carrier has failed or is unable to provide the
' 30
additional service.
In Illini State Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,3 1 the Commerce Commission granted a certificate of public convenience and necessity to a telephone company which
sought to compete with a phone company which was already
first in the field. The circuit court affirmed the Commission order. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The
Court reasoned: "Before one utility is permitted to take the
business of another already in the field it must be shown that
the existing one is rendering unsatisfactory service and is unable or unwilling to provide adequate facilities. '32 The Court
concluded that fllini State was "in these premises, 'first in the
field,' and entitled to the benefits of that doctrine as heretofore
announced by this Court." 33 If additional or extended service is
required, "and a utility in the field makes known its willingness
and ability to furnish the required service, the Commerce Commission is not justified in granting a certificate of convenience
and necessity to a competing utility until the utility in the field
has had an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to give the re34
quired service."
28. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 40 (1981).
29. Egyptian Transportation System, Inc. v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 321
Ill. at 587, 152 N.E. at 512.
30. Eagle Bus Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 3 Ill.2d at 70, 119
N.E.2d at 918.
31. 39 Ill.2d 239, 234 N.E.2d 769 (1968).
32. Id. at 243, 234 N.E.2d at 771.
33. Id. at 244, 234 N.E.2d at 771.
34. Chicago &West Towns Railways v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 383
Ill. at 27, 48 N.E.2d at 323. See Illini State Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 39

Ill.2d at 243, 234 N.E.2d at 771.
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Interexchange Toll Carriersare Public Utilities under Illinois
Law and Subject to Illinois Commerce Commission
Regulation
All interexchange carriers, including AT&T, will be operating under Illinois law as public utilities. "If a person or corporation assumes to act as a public utility and exercises the power
thereof ... it will be considered a public utility. '35 Even if the
business is not presently incorporated or regulated, it may nonetheless "be in fact a public utility. '36 Such corporations providing interexchange services will undoubtedly be public utilities
and subject to regulation by the Illinois Commerce Commission.
Under Illinois law:
"Public utility" means and includes every corporation, company
...that owns, controls, operates, or manages, within this State, directly or indirectly, for public use, any plant, equipment or property used or to be used for or in connection with, or owns or
controls any franchise, license, permit or right to engage in: ...the
transmission of... telephone messages between points within this
State ....37
Illinois law has clearly provided numerous policy, financial, and
administrative obstacles to competing utility operations within
the State.
The Sherman Act Does Not Pre-empt the Illinois
Public Utilities Act
The proposed agreement creates considerable conflicts with
Illinois law. The conflicts remain because the proposed agreement would not pre-empt the Illinois Public Utilities Act. Only
"the constitutional laws enacted by Congress ...,"38 the constitution or treaties can displace valid state law. A federal court
order, which does not purport to interpret federal law, the constitution, or treaties cannot, by itself, pre-empt valid state law.
The only federal statute at issue, although it is not mentioned in the stipulation, is the Sherman Act. 39 A state's sovereign power to enact a statutory scheme to regulate public
utilities operating within its borders is not preempted by the
35. Illinois Power &Light Corp. v. Consolidated Coal Co., 251 Ill. App. 49,
75 (3d Dist. 1928) cited in Danville Redipage v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
87 III. App.3d 787, 410 N.E.2d 328 (4th Dist. 1980).
36. Eagle Bus Lines, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 3 IU.2d at 71, 119
N.E.2d at 918.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 10.3 (1981).
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 415, 439 (1819). See also, Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979), Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S.
275 (1896).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1976).
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Sherman Act. In Parker v. Brown,4° the district court struck
down a California statute which created a statewide regulatory
system for the raisin industry on the ground that such a law violated the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, on direct appeal,
reversed. The Court reasoned:
[The program] derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state .... We find nothing in the language
of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state ...from activities directed by its legislature
....

41

[And concluded:] The Sherman Act makes no mention of

the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain
state action ....42
The Court emphasized repeatedly that state, not private action,
43
was approved, supported, or directed by the state statute.
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,44 a Maryland trial
court invalidated a state statute regulating the economic activity
of oil companies in the state. The state appellate court reversed.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
state act was not pre-empted by either the Robinson-Patman
Act or the Sherman Act because "[t] his Court is generally reluctant to infer pre-emption . . .45
The Court went on to reason that even if the state statute is
anticompetitive and "there is a conflict between the statute and
the central policy of the Sherman Act-our 'charter of economic
liberty'... this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for invalidating the Maryland statute."46 The
Court, without citing Parkerv. Brown, concluded that: "[I] f an
adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to
engage in ecorender a state statute invalid, the States' power to '47
nomic regulation would be effectively destroyed.
In New Mexico Vehicle Board of Californiav. Orrin W. Fox
Co. ,48 the Supreme Court reversed a district court which invalidated a state statute regulating retail motor vehicle dealerships.
The Court, citing Parker v. Brown, held: 'The dispositive answer is that the Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme
is a system of regulation, clearly articulatedand affirmatively
expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom
40.
41.
42.
43.

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
Id. at 350-51.
Id. at 351.
For a more through delineation of Justice Stone's opinion in Parker,

see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).

44. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id.

48. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
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." The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the antiS..
trust laws under the 'state action' exemption. 49 The Court further held that the statute did not conflict with the Sherman Act
it had articulated in Exxon Corp. v.
for precisely the reasons
5°
Governor of Maryland.
The Court has thus recited two standards of antitrust immunity for state statutes. First, the state statute must "clearly ar5
ticulate and express" an intent to regulate a particular field. '
Second, the state must directly supervise the regulatory activity.
In California Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum,5 2 the
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control enforced a
state statute which authorized wine growers, wholesalers, and
rectifiers to set and regulate wine prices. The California Court
of Appeals granted an injunction against enforcement of the
statute, holding that it violated the Sherman Act. The United
States Supreme Court, on certiorari after the California
Supreme Court declined to hear the case on appeal, affirmed.
The Supreme Court struck down the state statute reasoning
that although the legislative policy is forthrightly stated and
clear, it nonetheless "does not meet the second requirement for
Parker immunity. '5 3 The Court held that the state itself must
regulate the particular industry. The responsibility cannot be
improperly delegated and placed on the shoulder of private parties. With respect to the instant case, the Court observed that:
The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair
trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or
engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program. The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting
over what is essentially a
such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
54
private price-fixing arrangement.
Because the Illinois Public Utilities Act 5 5 satisfies both
prongs of the Parker-Midcaldoctrine, it is not preempted by the
Sherman Act. The Illinois statutory scheme clearly reflects a
legislative intent to regulate the public utilities field. Additionally, the Illinois Commerce Commission, like the agencies in
Parker and New Mexico Vehicle Board and unlike the agencies

49. Id. at 109 (emphasis added). See also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,
433 U.S. 350 (1977). Cf.Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 (1976);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788-91 (1975).
50. 439 U.S. at 111.
51. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341; see also New Mexico Vehicle Bd.
of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
52. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
53. Id. at 105.
54. Id. at 105-06.
55. ILi- REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3, §§ 1 et seq. (1981).
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in Cantor and Midcal, directly supervises the regulation of the
industry.
Distinguishing features affirm the social import of the Illinois Public Utilities Act. Under the Act, the Illinois Commerce
Commission regulates the activities of public utilities which are
also public corporations and which, most importantly, are socially necessary. The regulation of raisins, automobiles, and
wine, although important, is not as indispensable to the public
as is the regulation of electricity, gas, water, and telephones.
Moreover, every state in our nation has enacted a statutory
framework for regulating public utilities. Chaos and uncertainty
would prevail if a consent decree entered in one federal court
could pre-empt fifty states' and one district's laws.
The Proposed Order,As Written, Would Be An
UnconstitutionalInvasion of the State's Tenth
Amendment Powers
The Tenth Amendment also protects the integrity of Illinois'
statutory scheme. The threshold question is, as it was in determining pre-emption, to determine whether there is a "congressionally imposed displacement." 56 If the order were entered in
its present overbroad form, no present federal legislation would
be interpreted. As such, the states' "reserved" power is secure.
Assuming arguendo that the order, if entered, would have
the power of federal law, the order would then be an unconstitutional invasion of powers reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that a congressional
enactment violates the Tenth Amendment if three requirements
are met:
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates
the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address
matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty." And
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability57to "structure integral
operations in areas of traditional facilities."
All three requirements are met in this case.
First, the proposed settlement would in effect regulate the
"States as States." In Illinois, although the order would still allow the Illinois Commerce Commission to regulate intrastate
public utilities, it would have the effect of ordering the Illinois
56. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976). See also,

FERC v. Mississippi, 50 U.S.L.W. 4566, 4570 (1982); Transporation Union v.
Long Island R. Co., 50 U.S.L.W. 4316 (1982); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542

(1975); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
57. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264,
287-88 (1981), citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852, 854.
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Commerce Commission to constrain the nature and scope of its
regulation. The Commission, for example, would be compelled
to cease use of the division of revenue process, value transfers
of certain assets, and re-issue certificates of convenience and necessity for interexchange service. The directives imposed on the
Commission would be commands, not merely "condition [s] that
they consider the suggested federal standards. ' 58 The Commission, a state agency, would have no choice but to adhere to federal guidelines in executing its state function.
Second, the settlement infringes on matters which are "attributes of state sovereignty." "'[T]he authority to make ...
fundmental .. . decisions' is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty.. . . Indeed, having the power to make decisions ... is what gives the State its sovereign nature. '59 The
settlement order could wrest the direction of public policy from
effective control of the Commission and transfer it to the drafters of the agreement. The Commission would no longer have
the authority to determine appropriate areas of cross-subsidization. The decree would potentially preclude Commission control over the relationships between urban and rural Illinois
customers, toll and local services, and customer premises equipment and local rates. By so doing, the decree "impose [s] conditions on state activities in fields that are not pre-emptible, or
'
that are solely of intrastate concern. "60
Finally, the agreement substantially impairs "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Public
utility regulation has historically been "defer[red] to state pre-61 That the regulation of public
rogatives-and expertise ....
utilities is an integral state function which cannot be federally
usurped is consistent with holdings in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Railroad Co.,62 and United States v. California.63 In both cases, state operation of interstate railroads
was held not to be an integral role of state government. Regulation of intrastate rates and the operations of public utilities operating solely within the state, however, are traditional and
inherent functions of the states and their commissions. This
agreement would alter dramatically the nature and scope of utility regulation in Illinois.
58. FERC v. Mississippi, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4572 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 4571, citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851,
and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977).

60.
61.
62.
63.

FERC v. Mississippi, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4573 n.32.
Id. at 4572 n.29. See also, id. at 4576 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
50 U.S.L.W. 4315 (1982).
297 U.S. 175 (1936).
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Ramifications of Reorganized Structure of
Interexchange Services
Two major problems arise within Illinois once IBT (the Ilhinois BOC) is forbidden under the proposed settlement from
providing intrastate interexchange service. First, toll carriers
seeking certificates of public convenience and necessity to provide interexchange service may choose not to be certified in certain high cost rural areas. Several toll carries may seek
certification in the same high-density urban exchange. Second,
the financial integrity of the ITCs could be jeopardized.
Toll Service to Certain Exchanges may be Discontinued
The cost required to interconnect to a sparsely populated
rural exchange may exceed the revenues an interexchange carrier may recover. No rational carrier will provide service if its
costs exceed revenues. The carrier will thus not seek to serve
such exchanges, leaving many rural communities isolated. If
the rural ITCs lowered the charges for interconnecting with
their exchanges, to attract interexchange carriers, the concomitant increase in local rates might be excessive. The Illinois
Commerce Commission is empowered to solve this dilemma in
three ways. All the alternative solutions, however, conflict significantly with the letter and spirit of the proposed settlement
agreement. First, the Commission may grant a certificate to an
interexchange carrier for the entire state. The Commission can
thereby require the carrier to connect to all exchanges, rural
and urban, high and low cost, which seek access. Undoubtedly,
under the first in the field doctrine, discussed earlier, AT&T will
receive the sole certificate. Possession of the only interexchange certificate will serve to entrench AT&T's monopoly position, and decrease competition. These two results
diametrically counter the objective of the proposed decree.
Second, the Commission may continue to enforce existing
contracts between IBT and the ITCs. The present contracts for
intrastate interexchange service between IBT and the major
ITC "remain in effect until terminated by thirty days written notice by either party." The contracts contain no successor clause
to maintain IBT's commitment upon completion of the spin-off.
If IMT terminates its contracts with companies providing service
to rural communities, no guarantee exists that these communities will continue to receive service. The spectre of disconnected and discontinued service to rural exchanges looms large.
To forestall a return to the pre-1930's isolation in the rural areas,
the Commission is empowered to assure continued service to all
areas within Illinois. The Illinois Public Utility Act provides:

19821

The AT&T Agreement

"[N]o public utility shall abandon or discontinue any service
without first having secured the approval of the commission
.... "64 Thus the Commission may refuse to release IBT from
its contractual obligations, and compel it to adhere to the contracted terms. By enforcing the contracts, the ICC can order
IBT to provide interexchange service. Such enforcement, concomitantly, will compel IBT to violate the proposed settlement
agreement.
Finally, the Commission may select and compel, at its own
discretion, any telephone utility in Illinois to provide service to
any or all rural exchanges. The Commission may: "[After]
determin[ing] that public convenience and necessity requires a
physical connection for the establishment of a continuous line of
communications between any two or more public utilities for
the conveyance of messages or conversations . . . order that
''
such connections be made. 65
The Proposed Agreement Jeopardizesthe Financial
Integrity of the ITCs
The proposed agreement jeopardizes the ITC's investment
in telephone plant and equipment by replacing the division of
revenues (DR) process with access tariffs.6 6 The DR process
was negotiated and designed to serve the entire regulated telecommunications industry. The ITCs may, technically, still employ that method. As a practical matter, however, removing the
BOCs from the interexchange market assures the DR process'
demise.
The elimination of the DR process will financially constrain
the ITCs by reducing revenue from toll service. The DR process
had generated revenue for the ITCs by recognizing a portion of
customer premises equipment outside plant investment as a
cost for interexchange service. 6 7 This procedure thereby reflected local investment costs in interexchange rates. The proposed settlement disallows this cost allocating method. The
proposed exchange access charge shall not "require an interexchange carrier to pay for types of exchange access that it does
not utilize." 68 Effectively, this provision eliminates the present
subsidy from interexchange to the local loops. By removing this
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 49a (1981). See also Institute of Shorten-

ing &Edible Oils v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 45 Ill. App. 3d 98, 359 N.E.2d
231 (1977).
65. ILt. REv. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 47 (1981) (emphasis added).
66. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, section B(1).

67. 47 C.F.R. Part 67 (1980).
68. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, section B(2).
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benefit, ITCs may have no alternative but to raise their respective local rates to such a prohibitive level as to curtail the
number of customers seeking access. The number of customers
conceivably could diminish so much as to bankrupt the utility.
The proposed consent agreement threatens to isolate some
rural ITCs from the interexchange network. The ITCs which do
interconnect with the interexchange network may discover that
the revenue generated from interexchange calls will not include
a factor for recoupment of local exchange investment. Local
rates would rise accordingly and might be so dramatic as to curtail local access significantly.
THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT UNNECESSARILY RESTRICTS THE
BOCs' OPERATIONS AND HARMS ILLINOIS RATEPAYERS.

The proposed consent decree relegates the BOCs to providing only local service; the BOCs may no longer provide interexchange service or sell terminal equipment. These restrictions
would severely impede the BOCs' operating efficiency and raise
legitimate concerns of regulators. The relevant section of the
decree reads:
After completion of the reorganization specified in Section I, no
BOC shall, directly or through any affiliated enterprise:
1. provide interexchange telecommunications services or information services;
2. manufacture or provide telecommunications products or customer premises equipment (except for provision of customer
premises equipment for emergency service); or
3. provide any other product or service, except exchange telecommunications and exchange access service, that is not a monopoly service actually regulated by tariff.6 9

Developments in the Telecommunications Industry Priorto the
Proposed Agreement
To understand how radical a departure from current industry trends is the restriction of the BOCs' operations solely to local loop service, a historical perspective of industry
development is helpful. Through the late 1960's, the common
carrier segment of the telecommunications industry was an
enormous but dormant market. The use of the telephone was
the industry's central focus. AT&T, through Western Electric,
manufactured the overwhelming majority of telephones, switchboards, and related equipment. The BOCs then leased the
equipment to residential and business customers. The BOCs
also provided the facilities for placing local phone calls and for
69. Id. at section I(D).
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billing interexchange calls offered by the AT&T Long Lines
Department.
State or federal governments regulated almost every facet
of the industry-from the range and quality of equipment and
services to their prices. State public utility commissions regulated local BOC services and customer equipment. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) regulated AT&T's long distance services and interstate customer equipment.
In the last decade, rapid technological breakthroughs and a
spreading commitment to deregulation of the economy transformed the industry into a far more complex, fluid environment.
The FCC and courts began to open a number of markets to competition. The Carterfone70 decision allowed competition in the
terminal equipment market. Long distance telephone service
markets were opened to new suppliers. 71 This has encouraged
alternative interexchange services such as MCI and Southern
Pacific. AT&T, nevertheless, still accounts for 95.3% of total
Wide Area Telecommunications Services (WATS) revenues,
70. Carterfone, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968), reconsideration denied, 14
F.C.C.2d 571 (1968) (a tariffs blanket prohibition of interconnection of cus-

tomer premises equipment was unlawful); First Report and Order in Dock-

et No. 19528, 56 F.C.C.2d 592 (1975); on reconsideration, 57 F.C.C.2d 1216
(1976), 58 F.C.C.2d 716 (1976) and 59 F.C.C.2d 83 (1976); Second Report and
Order in Docket No. 19528, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976), affd sub nom. North Carolina Utilities Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
874 (1977) (laying the foundation for the FCC's registration program to permit direct connection of customer-provided terminal equipment to the nationwide telephone network); Final Decision in Docket No. 20828 (Second
Computer Inquiry), 45 Fed. Reg. 31319 (FCC 1980) (requiring, inter alia,
detariffing of carrier-provided customer premises equipment by March 1,
1982); modified in part on reconsideration, 46 Fed. Reg. 59976 (FCC 1981)
(extending the date for detarifflng of "new" carrier-provided customer
premises equipment from March 1, 1982, to Jan. 1, 1983). Such competitors
include Digital Equipment Corp. and Rolhm Corp. Note that terminal
equipment is the instrument at customer premises through which
messages are transmitted, viz., a telephone.
71. See Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 935 (1969), reconsideration denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970). See also MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 ( D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (Execunet decisions authorizing new suppliers
to begin competing with AT&T in the offering of long distance services);
MTS/WATS Market Structure Inquiry, Dkt. No. 78-72, 45 Fed. Reg. 55777
(FCC 1980) (further opening up long distance service markets to competi-

tion); First Report and Order, Dkt. No. 79-252, 45 Fed. Reg. 76148 (FCC 1980)

(reducing common carrier regulation of nondominant telecommunications
carriers); Resale and Shared Use of MTS and WATS, Dkt. No. 80-54, 45 Fed.
Reg. 83580 (FCC 1980) (authorizing firms to share AT&T's WATS service or
to resell it for a profit).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:563

revenues, and 87.6% of total
88% of total message toll service
72
private line service revenues.
Perhaps the most significant change in the telecommunications industry in the last decade was the increasing demand for
"enhanced services." Enhanced services are communication
services that involve not just the basic transmission of data, but
also its computer processing or other modifications. Certain enhanced services permit businesses to hook up their computers
to "talk" to each other electronically.
The 1956 consent decree, however, prohibited AT&T from
engaging in any business other than "common carrier communications services" or services "incidental" thereto. 73 AT&T thus
sought relief from the courts, the FCC, and Congress to permit it
to enter non-common carrier fields. In 1980, the FCC, in its Computer II 4 decision, held that AT&T could offer unregulated enhanced services if it did so through a "fully separated
subsidiary," viz, "American Bell." A New Jersey federal court in
September 1981 ruled that the 1956 decree permitted AT&T to
establish an unregulated subsidiary as required by Computer
H1.75
Besides seeking court and commission relief from the constraints of past decrees, AT&T has been seeking a Congressional
deregulation bill to affirm its right unequivocally to provide enhanced services. The Senate passed a bill in October 1981
which, inter alia, authorized AT&T to sell enhanced services
through American Bell.7 6 The House Telecommunications Subcommittee passed the Telecommunications Act of 198177 which
is more restrictive on AT&T's operations than the Senate bill.
The courts and the FCC have thus increasingly encouraged
competition in the terminal equipment and long distance markets over the last fifteen years. The consent decree, however,
removes the BOCs, AT&T's most formidable present potential
competitor, from competing with AT&T in any products or services market.
72. See S. Rep. No. 97-170, Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess, App. 1 (1981).

73. See supra note 3.
74. Final Decision in Docket No. 20820 (Second Computer Inquiry), 75
Fed. Reg. 31319 (FCC 1980), modified on reconsideration,46 Fed. Reg. 5984
(FCC 1981), effective date extended, 46 Fed. Reg. 59976 (FCC 1981). This
case is on appeal. Computer & Communications Industry Association v.
FCC, Civ. Nos. 80-1471 et al., (D.C. Cir. lead case fied May 5,1980).
75. United States v. Western Electric, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64, 275
(D.C. N.J. filed Sept. 3,1981), on appeal, United States v. Western Electric,
Civ. No. 81-2837 (3rd Cir. ified Nov. 6, 1981).
76. S. Rep. No. 97-170, Telecommunications Competition and Deregula-

tion Act of 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., App. I (1981).
77. H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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The ProposedAgreement Restricts the BOCsfrom Directly
Competing with AT&T in Interexchange Services
The consent decree prevents the BOCs from competing
with AT&T in interexchange (toll) service. This restriction effectively eliminates from competition AT&T's most threatening
challenger. As mentioned, potential interexchange competitors
are not likely to enter the rural market. Urban regions, on the
other hand, will receive a virtual plethora of vendors vying for
the relatively high-volume low-cost routes between urban centers. In Illinois, IBT would have been the strongest company, in
terms of finances, administration, and skill to mount a formidable challenge to AT&T in this market. The proposed agreement
renders IBT the only telecommunications firm unable to compete with AT&T.
The effect of removing IBT from direct competition with
AT&T in the interexchange market will be an increase in local
phone rates. Current regulatory practice in Illinois computes
revenues earned from toll calls placed by ratepayers into IBT's
operating income and the earned return on rate base. 78 The inclusion of toll revenue thus increases the overall earned return.
Accordingly, the loss of revenue from interexchange service
reduces the overall earned return. Local service expense will be
less subsidized, if at all. To compensate the utility for this loss
of revenue, and to maintain a stable rate of return, an increase
in local rates will be essential. IBT has consistently argued in
various rate proceedings before the ICC 79 that state toll rates
recover their associated costs and provide a substantial contribution to local service. This substantial contribution is commonly referred to as the subsidy from toll to local service. AT&T
apparently concurs in its subsidiary's position. The parent is
now seeking to capture for itself most of this subsidy.
The ProposedAgreement Restricts the BOCs from Directly
Competing with AT&T in Customer Premises
Equipment
A second restriction eliminates BOC competition with
AT&T in the provision of "telecommunications products or customer premises equipment."8 0 The BOCs thus may not compete
with AT&T in markets for, inter alia, telephones, switching systems, inside wiring, terminal equipment, and Phone Center
78. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel., Ill. C.C. Dkt. 81-0478 (May 25, 1982). The

rate comprises those corporate assets which are purchased and maintained
with money received from ratepayers.
79. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel., Ill. C.C. Dit. 81-0478 (May 25, 1982).
80. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Part II (D) (2).
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Stores. This restriction, much like the restriction on interexchange competition, hinders the ability of the BOCs to earn
their revenue requirement. The revenue generated from sales
of customer premises equipment (CPE) covers costs and provides a subsidy to local service. This particular restriction raises
an additional and important concern. IBT's capitalized investment in station connections 81 will probably become dead-weight
investment.
Recent changes in accounting procedures now permit telephone utilities to expense the installation costs of station connections, instead of capitalizing them. The undepreciated value
of previously capitalized station connections will amortize over
ten years. While the proposed consent decree clearly transfers
CPE from the BOCs to AT&T, it does not clearly specify the fate
of the investment in station connections. The Illinois ratepayer
may be disadvantaged by the vagueness of the proposed decree
if AT&T receives the investment in CPE while the BOCs retain
already capitalized station connection costs. If the station connections are not transferred to AT&T, the BOCs will incur maintenance and net depreciation expenses which cannot be offset
by a corresponding revenue. 82 Even if the station connections
account is transferred to AT&T, the BOCs will, nonetheless, be
disadvantaged by being the only telecommunications firm restricted from competing in the CPE market.
The ProposedAgreement Permits the BOCs to Provide Only
Natural Monopoly Service
The final restriction forbids the BOCs from providing any
service that is "not a natural monopoly service. '83 The proposed
agreement fails to define "natural monopoly service," a term
lawyers and economists have perennially debated. Although
the proposed agreement supplies no definition, certain assumptions are safe to make. The category of natural monopoly service presumably does not include yellow pages, tone paging
services, and two-way radio communications. Depriving the
BOCs of the revenues derived from these services would severely cripple their ability to maintain constant rates. Yellow
pages alone, according to figures supplied by IBT,contribute as
81. Account 232, 47 C.F.R. Part 31.232 (1980). Station connections are,
simply, the wiring from the customer's phone to the telephone pole.
82. The BOCs would recover their expenses by charging their customers for maintaining inside wiring. Electric companies have been reluctant
to adopt such an approach.
83. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Part II (D) (3).
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much as sixty-eight million dollars over cost per year.84 Prohibiting the BOCs from providing non-monopoly services renders
these independent entities the only telecommunications firms
not allowed to compete in the yellow pages, tone paging services, and two-way radio communications markets.
Natural monopoly service has been defined as "where [a]
monopoly is inevitable because it is the cheapest way of organizing an industry, . . . [or where] average costs are declining at
the point where demand intersects marginal costs. '85 This definition requires the measurement of both the firm's demand and
marginal costs functions. No standard, generally accepted,
method currently exists, however, for measuring marginal cost
function of a telephone utility. Thus, to allow the BOCs to provide only natural monopoly services is unreasonable because of
the difficulty in determining which services are natural
monopolies.
Paradoxically, AT&T may be competing with the BOCs in
the local service market, ostensibly a natural monopoly service.
Two-way radio communications may eventually develop as a
substitute for local exchange service. Armed with this technology as well as coaxial cables, cellular circuits, microwave discs,
and satellites, AT&T is capable of actually challenging the BOCs
in select local exchange services. These select exchange services would utilize the very customer premises equipment that
the BOCs are compelled to transfer to AT&T. 86 The CPE would
enable AT&T to bypass the BOCs' local exchange switches for
intracorporate calling. Since AT&T has the capability of competing with the BOCs for local exchange services, such service may
not literally be termed "natural monopoly service." By competing with AT&T in local exchange service, the BOCs would violate
the proposed decree.
84. The DOJ maintains that the BOCs can recover their profits from yellow pages, with licensing and bidding arrangements. Its "Competitive Impact" Statement asserts:
Each BOC, however, retains the rights inherent in its fie of telephone
subscribers including machine-readable listings and copyright interests

in the printed alphabetic directory. Hence, by granting use-specific
licenses for the listings, including use for the purpose of compiling and
publishing Yellow Pages, each divested BOC effectively will have the
ability to sell the Yellow Pages "franchise" to the highest bidder
through whatever mechanism or pricing scheme the divested BOC or

appropriate regulatory commission deems appropriate.
Competitive Impact Statement, filed for United States v. AT&T, No 82-0025
(PI) at 28-30 n.24 (filed in D.D.C. March 1982). This solution is not tenable,

since customers of the yellow pages services give their numbers directly to
the provider of the service; no need for the BOC'c middleman services
remains.
85. R. POSNER,

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 251

(2d ed. 1977).

86. Preeminent are the private branch exchanges (PBX).
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In conclusion, the proposed agreement restricts the BOCs
to providing service only in local exchanges. It prevents the
BOCs from entering any market except local exchange service.
It unleashes every conceivable telecommunications firm to compete fully with AT&T--except the BOCs. The BOCs, in reality,
are the most efficient potential challenger to prevent an AT&T
market stranglehold. In addition, the proposed decree eliminates many subsidies which have heretofore served to reduce
local rates.
THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT CONFLICTS WITH ILLINOIS
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW AND PUBLIC POLICY

The third and final concern raised by the proposed settlement agreement is potential conflict with well-settled Illinois
law and public policy. Three provisions in the proposed agreement either require Commission review and approval or conflict
directly with Illinois public policy. First, the proposed agreement requires IBT to transfer certain assets to AT&T.8 7 Under
the Illinois Public Utilities Act, the ICC may review and approve
or reject any such transfer.8 8 The Act also requires AT&T, as a
public utility,89 to seek ICC approval of its rates.90 Of additional
concern is the proposed agreement's requirement that access
tariffs be nondiscriminatory and "cost justified." 91 The proposed
agreement does not, however, prescribe the type of cost which
will be recognized. Moreover, the present subsidy of rural and
local exchanges is a direct result of deliberate discrimination.
Non-discrimination thus impairs the state's ability to limit the
monopoly 92 and undermines the long-standing state and national policy promoting "universal service."
Transfer of Facilities

The proposed agreement requires IBT to transfer, within six
months of the spin-off, certain assets to AT&T. AT&T will receive from IBT, inter alia, customer premises equipment, private branch exchanges (PBXs) and inside wiring. 93 The Illinois
Public Utilities Act subjects such transfers to the jurisdiction of
the ICC. The Act provides:
87. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Section I.

88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8a (1981).
89. Id. at § 10.3.
90. Id. at § 41.
91. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, B(2).
92. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
93. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Section IA(4).
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The Commission shall have jurisdiction over affiliated interests
having transactions,... with public utilities under the jurisdiction
of the Commission, to the extent of access to all accounts and
records of such affiliated interests relating to such transactions, includin access to accounts and records of joint or general expenses
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of these provisions in Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v.

Slattery.95
An "affiliated interest" includes "[e]very corporation and
person owning or holding, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of
the voting capital stock of such public utility. 9 6s AT&T, as 100%
owner of the voting capital stock of IBT, is the local company's
"affiliated interest." As IBT's affiliated interest, AT&T is subject

to ICC jurisdiction. The ICC, consequently, must approve any
asset transfer which the proposed agreement requires.

The

eighteen-month period for completion of the transfers 97 may be
unfeasible, given the realities of the state administrative and appellate processes.

The Commission is ultimately empowered to disapprove
any of the terms of any proposed transfer mandated by the

agreement. The Illinois Public Utilities Act provides:
No management, construction, engineering supply, financial or similar contract and no contract or arrangement for the purchase, sale,
lease or exchange of any property or for the furnishing of any service, property or thing, hereafter made with any affiliated interest, as
hereinbefore defined, shall be effective unless it has first been fied
with and consented to by the Commission. The Commission may
condition such approval in such manner as it may deem necessary
to safeguard the public interest. If it be found by the Commission,
after investigation and a hearing, that any such contract is not in
the public interest, the Commission may disapprove such contract.
by the
Every contract or arrangement not consented to or excepted
98
Commission as provided for in this Section is void.
Jurisdictionover Tariffs

The proposed agreement requires that all the BOCs "begin
to offer to all interexchange carriers exchange access on an unbundled, tariffed basis .... ,99 The proposed agreement further
requires that "[t]he BOCs are ordered and directed to fie, to
become effective on the effective date of the reorganization...
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8a(c) (1981).
320 U.S. 300 (1937).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8a(2)(a) (1981).
Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, section I(A).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 8a(3) (1981) (emphasis added).
Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, (A) (1).
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tariffs for the provision of exchange access . . . ."00 The proposed agreement, however, fails to define which Commission,
the FCC or ICC, has jurisdiction over the tariffs. It also neglects
to account for the provision which requires thirty days notice to
the Commission before filing new tariffs. 1' 1
The Illinois Public Utilities Act clearly affords the ICC jurisdiction over the tariffs the proposed agreement requires. Pertinent provisions state:
When any change [in tariffs] is proposed ... such proposed
change shall be plainly indicated on the new schedule filed with the
Commission ... [T]he Commission shall have power, and it is
hereby given authority ...to enter upon a hearing concerning the
propriety of such rate or other charge . . .On such hearing, the
Commission shall establish the rate or other charges, classifications, contracts, practices, rules of regulations proposed, in whole
or in part, 10or2 others in lieu thereof, which it shall find just and
reasonable.
Conflict arises from the proposed agreement's restrictions on
the structure and content of the tariffs. The proposed agreement depicts tariffs which are "unbundled. . .specifying each
type of service, element by element, and no tariff shall require
an interexchange carrier to pay for types of exchange access
that it does not utilize.' 0 3 Nothing in the Illinois Public Utilities
Act, however, requires the Commission to enforce tariffs with
such restrictions.
Corporate Form
The Illinois Commerce Commission may assert jurisdiction
10 4
If
over all intrastate interexchange carriers as public utilities.
the BOCs spin-off into one national corporation, or even a few
regional corporations, 0 5 separate Illinois subsidiaries, akin to
IBT, would have to be established. Certainly the ICC could not
retain total jurisdiction over all subsidiaries. Preeminent among
potential problems is misallocation of costs and revenues between states by a multi-state corporation creating a subsidy
from one state to another.
100. Id. at

(B)(1).

101. ILL. REV.
102.
103.
104.
105.
BOCs.

STAT.

ch. 111-2/3 § 36 (1981).

Id.
Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, App. B, (B) (2).
See supra note 37.
The proposed agreement permits any number of permutations of
Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, Section I(H)(4).
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The ProposedAgreement Potentially Deprives the ICC of Its
Power to Determine Costs and Reasonably Discriminate
on Rates
The proposed agreement requires that "charges for each
10 6 "Cost" justifitype of exchange access shall be cost justified."'
cation is required implicitly by disallowing BOCs to discriminate between customers "in the charges for each element of
service .... "-107 Two problems arise. First, the proposed agreement fails to define "cost." Accountants and economists employ
several major types of cost criteria, e.g., marginal costs, embedded direct costs, fully distributed costs. 10 8 Each cost criterion
produces different service and customer class cost relationships.
Vastly different results may occur, depending on which cost criterion is adopted. The appropriate forum to determine the cost
criterion is also not specified. The FCC, ICC, and federal courts
could adopt widely differing approaches. The agreement, moreover, neglects to specify the requisite burden of proving which
cost criterion is appropriate.
Second, the proposed agreement's restriction on "discrimi09
nation" by the BOCs in charging AT&T for interconnections1
conflicts with Illinois regulatory practices. The Illinois Public
Utilities Act, although disallowing discrimination in the provision of service, permits reasonable differences in rates charged
different service or customer classes. The Act provides: "No
public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates or other charges, services, facilities, or in any
other respect, either as between localities or as between classes
of service." 110 The Act, further, does not require rates to be
identical, only "just and reasonable.""' "A mere difference in
l l2
Alrates alone does not constitute undue discrimination.""
lowing some degree of reasonable discrimination is a difficulty
the ICC faces in reconciling the cost of service and the "revenue
requirement" (which varies from densely populated to sparsely
populated regions) needed to generate a fair return on investment. Rates must generate revenue sufficient to achieve a fair
106. Id. at App. B, $ (B)(2).
107. Id. at section H(B)(3).

108. Many variations of each type of cost criteria exist. The FCC, for example, has considered seven different definitions of fully distributed costs.
109. Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, AT&T, section 1(B)(3).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 38 (1981). See St. Charles v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 21 Ill.2d 259, 172 N.E.2d 353 (1961).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 36 (1981).
563, 568, 95
112. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 359 mll.
N.E. 32, 34 (1935).
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return on investment. 113 The revenue required to achieve a fair
return, however, may be difficult to assess. The revenue requirement will depend on which cost of service criterion is
adopted, and whether rates are actually set at cost. Price discrimination between service and/or customer classes serves to
adjust rates both to meet a revenue requirement and implement
public policy goals such as universal service. The Commission,
therefore, must inevitably adopt some form of "discrimination."
The ProposedAgreement Undermines the Goal
of Universal Service
National and state policy has long promoted the goal of
"universal service." The Communications Act of 1934 envisioned: "a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges ....

for the purpose of promoting safety of life

Illinois law and policy, through certification, contracts,
and limited monopolies, effectuate this goal.
The proposed consent decree jeopardizes the continuation
of the policy of universal service. First, the proposed agreement
does not guarantee that high cost areas will be connected. Rural
areas face the threat of losing local and long distance service. 115
Second, the proposed decree fails to guarantee the financial integrity of the BOCs. The transfer of customer premises equipment to AT&T and the elimination of revenue generated from
16
the yellow pages deprives the BOCs of vital revenue sources. "
Finally, the proposed agreement attempts to circumvent ICC supervision over local companies and rates.11 7 The proposed
agreement, in thirteen pages, reverses half a century of consistent nationwide and statewide policies.
....

"114

113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111-2/3 § 32 (1981) requires Illinois public utilities
to seek rates which are "just and reasonable." Just and reasonable rates

permit utilities to earn a fair return on their investment. Union Elec. Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77 Ill.2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 510 (1979); Monarch Gas
App. 3d 892, 366 N.E.2d 45 (1977);
Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 51 Ill.
App. 379, 5 N.E.2d 285
People's Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Slattery, 287 Ill.
(1937).
114. 47 U.S.C. § 515 (1976). The harbinger of this Act was the arrangement between Theordore Vail and the Justice Department. Vail, as president of AT&T, was guaranteed a monopoly in exchange for his promise to
promote universal usage.
115. See supra pp. 576-77.

116. See supra pp. 577-78.
117. See supra pp. 574-75.
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The AT&T Agreement
CONCLUSION

The proposed settlement agreement in U.S. v. AT&T is far
broader than necessary to effectuate its procompetitive goals.
Above all, the consent decree would actually reorganize the entire telecommunications industry-a province reserved to Congress. Only a legislative enactment should attempt to
restructure the relationships between AT&T, the BOCs, the
ITCs, the FCC and State Commissions, and non-common carrier
corporations. Second, prohibiting the BOCs from providing long
distance, CPE and other services eliminates AT&T's most viable
potential competitors, and entrenches AT&T's monopoly position in these unregulated markets. The decree thus not only
fails to foster competition, it promotes two monopolies-one in
local service, one in unregulated service. Third, relegating the
BOCs to provide only natural monopoly services removes many
subsidies which had heretofore contributed to the local companies' revenue requirements. Without these subisidies, higher local rates will be the only source available to generate the
required revenue. Fourth, the agreement eliminates the division of revenues process, which accounts for the independent
telephone companies' primary source of revenue. This fact, coupled with the high cost of connection to sparsely populated rural
areas, will potentially cripple the financial integrity of many
ITCs and could cause either precipitous price increases or vast
disconnections in rural areas. Fifth, the dramatic acceleration of
local rates and potentially diminishing interconnection of rural
areas undermines a half century of national commitment to the
goal of universal telephone service. The spectre looms large of a
return to the era when phones were considered a luxury. Finally, the agreement creates unnecessary and irreconcilable
conflicts with well-settled state laws and policies. These conflicts remain because state regulation of intrastate public utilities is protected by both the state action doctrine and the tenth
amendment.
The court, in deciding whether to enter this decree, is faced
with two choices. One, it could refuse to enter the order and
await congressional action. Two, it can suggest 18 to the parties
that they amend the settlement to provide for a complete divestiture of the BOCs, in their present form.
118. Under the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1976), a court has the power
only to suggest, but not order, modifications before entering a consent decree. See U.S. v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 715 (D. Mass. 1975). Of course, the
court can withhold approval of any proposed decree which conflicts with
the letter and spirit of the Tunney Act. United States v. Central Contracting
Co., 531 F. Supp. 133 (E.D. Va. 1982).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 15:563

With the BOCs spunoff immediately in their present form,
the court can then suggest one of three provisions. One, the
court could recommend an order which would allow the BOCs
to compete freely in any market. This would promote both the
competitive goals of the settlement and the financial integrity of
the BOCs. Two, the order could compel the BOCs to sell their
CPE, long distance, and other non-natural monopoly services to
AT&T at a price derived from arms-length bargaining. A fair
price is difficult to estalish between AT&T and the BOCs in their
present parent-subsidiary relationship. The revenue generated
by the sale of assets, moreover, can replace some of the BOCs'
lost subsidy. Finally, the court could order the BOCs to sell the
above services to any purchaser, presumably the one with the
best offer. This provision would assure a competitive, free market price for the services and guarantee that AT&T would face
ready competition.*

*

This article went to press in April, 1982. On August 11, 1982, Judge

Green issued a 178-page opinion which stated that he would not enter the

consent decree unless the parties agreed to certain major modifications,
namely, that the BOCs retain yellow pages and customer premises equipment marketing services. The court denied the DOJ's subsequent petition
to reconsider the latter suggestion. The consent decree was entered, with

these modifications, on August 24, 1982. Intervenor status was granted certain states (including Illinois), state commissions, competitors, and public

interest groups on August 26, 1982. Appeals from the consent decree,
which must be filed by September 25, 1982, will most likely focus on two
issues: the continued restriction on the BOC's providing of toll services and
the role of state regulatory commissions.

